Military blueprints by major space-faring powers now encapsulate concepts of 'space support' and 'force enhancement' which point to a central role of space assets in facilitating military operations while notions of 'space control' and 'force application' suggest the weaponization of space, and the putative view that space may in the near future be a theatre of military operations. As defence goals increasingly focus on space as the final frontier evident in development of national missile defence systems, anti-satellite weapons and other space-based systems, international peace and security faces a new challenge. Creators of the current legal regime for space failed to foresee the rapid rate at which technological and engineering breakthroughs would take place. Now the shortcomings in the current regime beg the question of how the law can keep up and address space technology. It is imperative that the international community act now rather than later. In light of the existing lacunae in the international space law regime, this Article seeks to explore avenues/paradigms through which the militarization of space may be regulated and its weaponization addressed.
INTRODUCTION
The increasing militarization and weaponization of outer space poses difficult legal questions and also represents a clear and present danger to international peace and security. There is already a fear of an arms race being undertaken in space, with the latest developments in Washington, Moscow and Beijing adding further fuel to that fire. With the world's major powers increasingly reliant for their security on space assets, Russia and China are keen to cement their place as space superpowers as counterweights to the United States ('US'). China, in particular, has in recent years been concentrating on the development of military space assets and a leaner and efficient technologically driven military.
The effect of the initiatives by the US, Russia and China has been negative, since the net result has been to spur Europe to also re-examine the role of space in its defense policy. The old arms race dynamic appears to be reasserting itself, partly as a result of the increasing pace of the military activities of the major space powers but also as a result of the implementation of a European Security and Defense Policy. 1 With increased security requirements and the important role of space technology, the pressure is on the European Space Agency (ESA) to re-define its role and future contribution to European defense and security. 2 The most striking development is that ESA, which has traditionally been committed to peaceful uses rather than seeking to stop the emerging space arms competition, is instead joining the race. The creators of the current international legal regime for space could not have foreseen the rapid rate at which technological advancements and breakthroughs would take place. The shortcomings in the applicable legal principles beg the question of whether the Space Law regime can keep up with technology. While for almost its entire history, the United Nations ('UN') in general, and the Security Council in particular, have approached their mission in a reactive manner, this stance has become untenable in the face of a determined push by space-faring powers to not only dominate but also to control space as a battle frontier. As strategic defense goals increasingly focus on the development of national missile defense systems, involving ground-based defense and space-based systems, the international community must rise to these challenging issues in the interests of maintaining international peace and security, a fundamental purpose of the United Nations. 4 An arms race in space will inevitably lead to a situation where peace and security is seriously eroded and an atmosphere of insecurity is generated.
The central theme of this Article is that the weaponization of space and its evolution into a distinct theatre of military operations seems likely, given the reliance on space systems and the increasing militarization of space. The Article is premised on the reality that there will be a serious legal deficit in the absence of specific international norms restricting the possibility of outer space becoming a direct battlefield. In light of this reality, the Article will explore and articulate new paradigms that may contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and thus enhance the capacity of the international community to deal with a phenomenon which has moved from fantasy to likelihood.
CLEAR & PRESENT DANGER? CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS-ARMS (UN)LIMITATION
With major space-faring powers focusing on military aspects of space in force enhancement, a consideration of the issue of space weaponization has moved far from the once theoretical discussion debated by the early founders of the current international space law regime. Currently the US is spending billions of dollars in the research and development of advanced space 4 See Charter of the United Nations, article 1(1).
weapons, with its military establishment resolute that the dominance and control of space is a necessity.
In a similar vein, many senior political and military leaders in the other three major space-faring powers -Russia, Europe and China -have called for the allocation of more resources to the military utility of space. Russia and China in particular are actively devoting additional resources towards space command assets and established specialist space units within their respective military establishments.
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In September 2002 the US Administration issued a landmark national security policy paper which emphasized the need for: 'Innovation within the armed forces [which] will rest on experimentation with new approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S.
intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology.' 6 As an integral part of this policy, the Pentagon believed it was necessary to maintain technological supremacy so as to 'dominate the space dimension of military operations'. 7 The paper went on to note that this encompassed: 'the ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space. Id. 19 In 1998 of the United States Space Command ('USSPACECOM') released details of its Long Range Plan outlining the US military vision for control of space and developing a capacity to project force from space. The first two mission statements of USSPACECOM's Long Range Plan are pointed: 'space support' and 'force enhancement' meaning the use of space assets to facilitate military operations of combat forces on land, sea, and air. The next two mission statements: 'space control' and 'force application' are more controversial as they suggest the weaponization of space, and are most closely related to combat in a future theatre of military space operations. Overall these four mission areas encapsulate 'space control': U.S. SPACE COMMAND, LONG RANGE PLAN: IMPLEMENTING Recent advances in space technologies have put the development of space weapons within the realm of possibility for several countries. As a USAF board report (New World Vistas: Air and Space Power For The 2lst Century) states:
[i]n the next two decades, new technologies will allow the fielding of space-based weapons of devastating effectiveness to be used to deliver energy and mass as force projection in tactical and strategic conflict. These advances will enable lasers with reasonable mass and cost to affect very many kills.
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As the US pursues a policy that incorporates the placing of weapons in outer space, the other possibilities raised by the deployment of sophisticated space weapons systems. The United Nations is the obvious forum for this consultative process. It has maintained an active role in the passage of the leading multilateral treaties directly applying to the exploration and use of outer space and has an active Committee -the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ('COPUOS') -directed towards issues related to human activities in outer space. [t]he gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology-when that occurs, even weak States and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. In the international arena, any threat to global security is a problem shared by all members of the United Nations, particularly when new technology points to development of deadly, devastating space weaponry. In this respect, it is important to recall that the security system established under the United Nations structure addresses both form and substance. Indeed, the United Nations
AVENUES FOR ANCHORING AND SECURING
Charter does not absolutely prohibit the use of force in all circumstances, but it does seek to regulate its use. As the use of military force becomes more sophisticated and complicated, the United Nations must contribute to both the practice and scope of the disarmament agenda with regard to space. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.
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It should be remembered that the justification for the Soviet nuclear build-up during the Cold War was that it was merely a reaction to a US-initiated arms race (and vice versa). Yet, there is no way that a convincing argument can be made in the present circumstances to the effect that maintaining international peace and stability is enhanced by ratcheting up an arms race in outer space, with its attendant correlative danger of the use of armed force. There is a need for the United Nations to carry out a re-appraisal of its regime on the use of force and re-interpret it within this new paradigm. In certain aspects, the existence of the United Nations as a quasi-universal international institution has fundamentally changed the character of the international system and the postWorld War II international security system. This is based on the reality that, despite a number of (sometimes significant) failings, the United Nations Charter has shown itself capable of adapting to a variety of new tasks, although this process remains incomplete. While the United Nations
Charter system as a means to restrain the use of force has developed more fully than its ability to authorize and to enable States to use force against a member State, Article 1 remains pivotal to the mandate of the United Nations. That provision articulates a central purpose of the United Nations-'to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression.'
Given that the world had just emerged from a catastrophic war, the United Nations was founded to concentrate first and foremost on the peaceful settlement of international disputes and to rely on the military instrument of policy only as an extreme last resort. 42 The Security Council is required to fulfill a central constitutive principle of the United Nations, stated in the Charter's preamble: 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.' The undercurrent is a recognition that the United Nations Charter, although drafted before the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and space weapons, can accommodate a mandate to address the weaponization of space, but only if the United Nations seizes the chance before rather than after space powers actively deploy weapons and weapons systems in outer space. Ideally this would require a move from the prevailing United Nations which might then offer a window of opportunity to negotiate a total ban of weapons in outer space. Naturally, this would require a significant shift in political will among the major spacefaring nations, which although a difficult task, should be encouraged through negotiation and broader political pressure. 56 Given the history of the Security Council, the reality is that the scope of these terms is fluid and could well embrace the emerging space arms race by allowing the Security Council an avenue to classify certain activities in space as 'acts of aggression'. This would enable the regulation of the deployment by space faring powers of devices that are obviously geared to be offensive. its ballistic missile program; even though the tests in and of themselves were not illegal, nonetheless they represented a threat to international peace and security. This move by the Security Council sends a message that the world powers can work together and that the United Nations can effectively send a united message.
However, the Security Council must desist from double standards. In terms of destructive weaponry there is no such standard as 'responsible' and 'irresponsible' States. The only issue is the likelihood of deployment. To illustrate this concern, only three days after the North Korea test India launched its own long-range missile test which was not denounced. Regulation of the deployment of weapons in space should be consistent, unless the United Nations wishes to again become enmeshed in a situation where some States are able to officially enter into the 'Nuclear Club', and then close doors and adopt a paternalistic approach to others. This position does more damage in terms of nuclear proliferation than the whole policy towards so-called rogue nations.
Reinforcing this sentiment is the ongoing dilemma faced by the international community over Iran's nuclear program. Iran argues that it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ('NNPT'), 58 a right which in 2005 the US and the European Union ('EU') began to assert had been forfeited by a 'clandestine' nuclear programme. While it is beyond the scope of this article to deal with this contentious issue in detail, it should be noted in passing that Iran has frequently compared its treatment to other nations that have developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel, India and Pakistan. argues that it has a right to develop, research, and engage in the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Arms control policy and strategy, perceived as a program and framework in which the international community shares common objectives can be achieved on a basis of shared expectation and agreements, which serve the international community by providing greater strength and public security. In this vein, it may be the time to dust off some of the ideas encompassed by previous initiatives. For example, in 1957, Western States, including the US proposed the creation of an 'inspection system which would ensure the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.' 59 About three decades later in 1985, as the realization dawned that the US had leapt significantly ahead of it in the development of space weapon technology, the former Soviet Union proposed the creation of a 'World Space Organization,' which would ensure 'international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space in the context of its non-militarization.' 60 These proposals ought not to be viewed as simplistic pipe dreams, but rather as the basis for serious propositions that may well afford the international community the opportunity to engage in serious deliberations to address and contain the matter of space weaponization.
Resolving the 'Peaceful Purposes' Conundrum: Banning Space Weaponry
In the process of banning the placement of WMDs in orbit and the establishing of military bases in space, the Outer Space Treaty codified the term 'peaceful use of outer space.' However, no 59 While all hope for preserving space for peaceful purposes is not lost, [there is a need to] narrow the definition of peaceful purposes if progress is to be achieved. The era of space as a truly peaceful sanctuary may be gone, but it may not be too late to regulate space activities in an effort to mitigate the potential of space weaponization. 65 The United Nations Conferences on Disarmament, the General Assembly, COPUOS, and the international scientific community has proclaimed and repeatedly affirmed that outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, not for military advantage. 66 Even if one were to continue to accept the use of the non-military/non-aggressive dichotomy, 'no case can be made for a space- (1) The prohibition of the testing or deployment by placing in orbit around the Earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner of any space-based weapons for destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
(2) The prohibition of the use of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space. (3) The obligation of states not to destroy, damage, or disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states. (4) The prohibition of the testing or creation of new anti-satellite systems and the destruction of such systems that may already exist. (5) The prohibition of the testing or use of manned space craft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes. (6) The provision for a broad range of measures to verify compliance with the obligations envisaged by the treaty. 73 The Soviets proposed that the exclusion of outer space from the sphere of the arms race is an international obligation, and that the prevention of militarization would provide an opportunity for the peaceful use of space as a means to solve the acute economic, social and cultural development problems facing mankind. The General Assembly subsequently took this on board, noting its grave concern regarding the extension of an arms race into outer space and requesting the conclusion of a treaty to safeguard international peace and security. 74 Interestingly, in 2003, China publicly declared 'that space should not be militarized and that space technologies should be used for peaceful purposes '. 75 This is even more poignant when one considers that this was the same year that China joined the 'Space Club' elite after becoming only the third nation in the history of humankind to successfully launch a manned space flight.
On the one hand, some might seek to characterize the Soviet (Russian) proposals and the Chinese statements as some semblance of 'momentum' towards the prohibition and elimination of attack space weapons and all other systems designed to destroy objects in space. situation is not straightforward, with the current US National Space Policy and its missile defense shield proposals, together with the vitriolic responses elicited from both Russia and China, as significantly dampening any current hopes for a space weapons 'détente'. 76 In sum the future of space security will depend on how effectively all States strive for the 'deweaponization' of outer space and pressure the major space faring nations, and how those nations are able to set aside their differences. If they cannot, outer space will become even more susceptible to the exploitation of weapons technology. The ideal solution undoubtedly involves an extremely difficult exercise in international diplomatic negotiation, and the authors have no magic panacea as to how this might best be achieved in the short term. However, over time it is to be hoped that all stakeholders will come to realize that the alternate scenarios are far more frightening to contemplate.
Strengthening the Principles Underlying the Outer Space Treaty
The sentiments underlying the United Nations Charter were strengthened by the restrictions imposed in relation to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, although this provision in and of itself does not represent a complete restriction on the placement of weapons in outer space. 77 There have, from time to time, been proposals to amend Article IV in order to enhance these restrictions, but none of these has (yet) been accepted. 78 Some commentators argue that the determination of a peaceful use of space depends on the purpose of the activity. 79 The position taken is that 'purpose' is 'an intended or desired result; end, aim; goal.' 80 Extrapolating these positions would mean that arguments against the militarization and weaponization of outer space per se are rendered redundant, since the assertion by space faring nations is that their programs are geared towards advancing national self-defense -a 'peaceful purpose' and in any event one contemplated within the United Nations Charter.
Major Robert Ramey notes that the international space law regime discloses that, at a minimum, the following military activities in outer space are not comprehensively prohibited: Despite these potential 'loopholes', however, the reality is that the international law principles regulating the use and exploration of outer space require that 'outer space' be used for 'peaceful purposes'. The concept is an accepted axiom of customary international law and continues to be emphasizes international cooperation among all parties with an interest in space' with the ultimate goal being embodied in a treaty that would be designed to prevent the predominance of any single power in space. Given that space security involves commercial, military, scientific and political aspects, it might be worthwhile considering how to ensure that efforts directed towards the promotion of space security in the different realms are coordinated. While the answer may simply be to reinvigorate COPUOS, the international community should consider the creation of a new and voluntary annual gathering of all space stakeholders.
Reflections: Cross Roads-Leveraging Silver Bullets through the Green Bullet
As discussed above, Space Law regime has an interpretational flexibility which exposes serious internal contradictions. The 'peaceful purposes' centre-piece of Space Law does not rule out the military use of outer space or of commercial communications satellites. The Space Law regime yields little information on space warfare. Although major powers have pursued space militarization and weaponization for decades, this has not been done to ensure a fair fight between two opponents. Instead, we have witnessed a race to space supremacy.
There is little doubt that the paradigms outlined above are compelling and feasible. However, as the authors acknowledge above, the realpolitik associated with 'nation security interests' are complex at best and untidy at worst. Perhaps a trump card would be to use international environmental law as a lever. In light of steadfast US hostility and a general unwillingness to agree to a weapons-free space environment, perhaps the matter can be articulated with less acrimony and a larger measure of understanding through the lens of environmental protection, which offers a less contentious platform for curtailing space weaponization. As Lori Scheetz notes, by
[e]mploying an international environmental framework, the international community can address issues outside of traditional national security interests, such as the obligations of the present generation to prevent destruction of the space commons resulting from the development or use of space weapons. 89 atmosphere can remove satellites from orbit. 92 But this is only of limited utility as it applies only to Low Earth Orbit ('LEO'). With objects in Geo-Synchronous Orbit ('GEO') and SunSynchronous Orbit ('SSO') there is less air, hence reducing the ability for gravitational drag and potential ejection of debris. 93 Disturbingly, once debris settles into orbit at more than 1,500 kilometers above Earth's surface, it remains there indefinitely, continuously orbiting Earth at up to 17,000 miles per hour. 94 Of the estimated 3,500,000 objects that reside in outer space, only about 8,500 objects are currently trackable. 95 Some experts believe that, even if mankind launched no new objects into orbit, the debris population would continue to increase exponentially and make at least parts of Earth orbit, such as LEO, unusable. 96 The matter is serious, warranting the inclusion of the general topic of space debris being placed on the COPUOS agenda in the early 1990s out of concern for military and national security programs, as well as the costs of the removal of known debris.
Professor Marietta Benkö notes:
… problems resulting from the production of space debris do not only affect the (growing) number of space-faring nations, but also every single country and its inhabitants. Every day life world-wide depends significantly on space services. Let me just mention: phone, fax and online banking as well as the use of the internet as a source of communication and information…Therefore civilians and the military have the same interest in keeping outer space 'clean' which makes the rational and prudent use of this environment an imperative in order to preserve its uses also for future generations.
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The continued collision of debris (which increases exponentially the more the debris) could eventually 'produce so much dust that a lasting twilight will cast over the Earth, shrouding the planet in a haze of metallic pollution.' 98 The matter is accentuated further in the case of deliberate use of kinetic and hypervelocity weapons in space. Some scholars have emphasized that a war in space could create a battlefield that would last forever, with the capacity to encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris, thus making space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes. 99 'One of the most serious dangers posed by debris is the 'cascade effect' -a process by which space debris will become self-generating and therefore uncontrollable. 100 The more space objects in orbit, the greater the probability that there will be a collision. With each new collision, there is a corresponding increase in the amount of debris, which would then result in an even greater probability of collisions. 101 Professor Benkö cautions:
… it is established that [space debris] do not only pose a risk to space activities in the orbit where they were generated. For example, if an Earth orbit is polluted by a debris cloud (which is always spreading rapidly i.e. through the uncontrolled collision of the debris pieces with each other as well as explosions as a result of such collisions) access from the Earth to outer space can be in serious danger if space objects have to cross this orbit upon launch or re-entry. As a result such an orbit can have the effect of 'barbed wire' around the Earth. 102 The use of international environmental law finds a base in the Space Law regime through several core provisions. The Liability Convention addresses State liability for activities in outer space. In 2007, the Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS expressed concern about the risk that the creation of space debris, intentional or otherwise, represented to human spaceflight, space infrastructure and space activities. 107 Since outer space is the 'common heritage of all mankind', all countries have a right to provide input to the finalization of the policies and objectives of any organization affecting outer space, regardless of their level of involvement in space. Sustainable development provides a feasible international environmental avenue toward banning (all or at least most) space weapons and effectively accomplishing the central objectives of intergenerational equity. 108 Considering that orbital debris is a serious consequence of space exploration and use, 109 the vision and foresight of decades past must be revisited and revised to preserve and protect the environment of outer space.
CONCLUSION
Because of its uniquely commanding height, outer space has gained even greater military and strategic value in the post-cold-war international strategic environment. This provides for the possibility that outer space will become a platform for warfare. This development will only result in negative consequences. It will disrupt global strategic balances and stability, undermine international and national security and harm existing arms control arrangements, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles. All of these will inexorably trigger a new arms race -the symptoms of which we are already witnessing.
In addition, the deployment and use of space weapons will seriously threaten the security of space assets and risks causing irreversible harm to the biosphere of the earth. A common sense approach will not unduly jeopardize the economic and strategic interests of those States utilizing space technology, but will make it clear that there are strict binding limits as to how far and for what purposes this technology can be implemented.
The international community should, ideally, not allow developing space warfare technologies to outpace the international space law regime. Even if this is not possible in every respect, the fluidity and flux of international politics ought to offer a strong reason for the United Nations to 109 Majority of civilian and military telecommunication satellites are in GEO, along with many meteorological, broadcasting, data relay, tracking, and remote sensing satellites. The primary problems with debris generation in GEO are the limited number of available slots and the fact that, in GEO, objects that are not removed can have orbital lifetimes nearing ten million years. See H. A. Baker, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATION, 25-26 (1989).
categorically deny each and every nation explicit or tacit permission to place weapons in outer space, since changing geopolitical dynamics will lead other aspiring space powers along the same path. In the absence of such action, there is an increasing likelihood that outer space will not only be used to facilitate armed conflict (as it already is) but will become a theatre of war. The tendency of the major militarized powers to rely ever increasingly on space technology is spiraling into a space weapons race. Even though the US may still claim space superiority, it can only be a matter of time before other space-faring countries -Russia, China and perhaps Indiawill have developed equally sophisticated (and potentially devastating) space weapons technology.
This Article has indicated that, when the stark reality of space warfare dawns on humankind, there will be a serious legal deficit in the absence of specific international norms restricting the deployment of weapons in outer space. The risks that space warfare will become a reality necessitate the formulation of a new legal commitment in the international community, leading either to the conclusion of a treaty that comprehensively bans the deployment of weapons in outer space, or at the very least to the adoption of amendments to the Outer Space Treaty designed to clarify that 'peaceful' means precisely that, hence avoiding sophist arguments by space powers.
Although the meaning of the phrase 'peaceful uses of outer space' has long defied specific definition, the dangers can be best addressed if parameters are established that bypass the sometimes conflicting self interests of space-faring powers, and once again focus on the 'collective humanity' principles of space law and the use and exploration of outer space. These goals no doubt confront very complex and traditional perceptions (among some States at least) of sovereignty, but in the end represent the most secure route towards the exploration and use of outer space.
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The space faring powers have repeatedly expressed a commitment to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. States should pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national and international space activities and work together to ensure the continued exploration and use of outer space strictly for peaceful purposes. Prevention of an arms race in outer space should be actively advocated. We must move towards the negotiation of a comprehensive international legal instrument addressing issues of space weaponization, based on the accepted principle that space is the common heritage of mankind, The progress of human society will suffer should space -which offers so much to all of us as a catalyst for peaceful development and innovation -is be transformed into a military frontier.
